Saturday 21 Jul 2018 | 04:29 | SYDNEY
Saturday 21 Jul 2018 | 04:29 | SYDNEY

Monday linkage


Sam Roggeveen


11 January 2010 12:49

  • The Asia Foundation surveys regional attitudes about the economy in 2010.
  • The Lowy Institute's own Raoul Heinrichs writes on Asian regional architecture for the Asia Security Initiative blog.
  • The Obama Administration has agreed to sell Patriot missiles to Taiwan, but F-22 fighters should also be on the agenda.
  • Highly recommended: The Australian's George Megalogenis on how new media is changing our politics.
  • Explosive account of John Edwards' 2008 US presidential campaign.
  • Sign o' the times: the Indian Air Force used to look to Russia for transport planes; now it looks like it's going American.
  • Last week I linked to a provocative Guardian piece describing how China undermined the Copenhagen negotiations. James Fallows is now collecting links to other accounts of what happened in Denmark.
  • Right on. The Cato Institute on airport security screening: 

As a corrective brace “teaches” the proper posture just by making it the only comfortable one, the screening procedures embed a set of tacit instructions, consisting of the optimal set of motions required to pass through smoothly...That’s not to say airport security is some kind of insidious brainwashing program, but there’s a dimension of privacy here that it seems to me we don’t talk about nearly enough. Our paradigms of privacy harms are invasion (the jackboot at the door, in the extreme case) and exposure (the intimate detail revealed). We generally think of these as exceptions — as what happens when surveillance goes wrong, either because it gets the wrong target or, when the surveillance is universal by design, because information that’s supposed to remain protected falls into the wrong hands or is otherwise misused. Invasion and exposure may be serious problems, but they are fundamentally mistakes — hiccups in the system we can seek to fix.

Discipline, by contrast, is what inevitably happens when the system functions as intended, at least to the extent people are conscious of being (actual or potential) targets of surveillance. It is probably not as serious a harm as invasion or exposure most of the time, but it’s also by far the most pervasive and ineradicable effect of surveillance.